The vertical scale problem necessitated the following mitigations:
- Reduce the amount of time spent in the death zone to the minimum essential for success. This is why Advance Base was established at the foot of the Lhotse Face, below the death zone; the final Assault teams set off from here and marched near-continuously to conquer the summit. While there was an Assault Camp on the South Col (in the death zone), that was never planned for long-term stay. That was more like a supply dump and transit camp for overnight stays (though Hillary and Tenzing were held up here longer due to inclement weather).
- Acclimatization. A full three weeks were were built into the plan to climb minor eminences in the Khumbu area to get the climbers use to the rarefied conditions.
- Use of bottled oxygen. Significant research went into perfecting bottled oxygen equipment with a view to making them lighter and more portable. While a new technology called closed-circuit promised lesser weight, it was unproven. Hence, John Hunt decided to use both closed-circuit and the proven but heavier open-circuit (Hillary and Tenzing succeeded using the open-circuit equipment). [In a sense, the use of two types of oxygen equipment was also a risk mitigation - mitigating against the risk of the failure of any one type of oxygen equipment - which paid rich dividends. But this is not how John Hunt thought about it.]
- Lifting supplies as high as possible on the mountain, so that the assault parties can have more resources at their command thus increasing their chance of success.
This last point needs elaboration. Here is John Hunt once again:
Among much good advice, I was to remember particularly Norton’s words: “The whole history of Himalayan climbing seems to me to emphasise [the fact] that attempts have always been made from too low an assault camp…the finalists [have been] defeated by attempting too long a climb on the last day…put your assault camp on, or very close under the Southern Summit. Assuming considerable step cutting will be necessary beyond the Southern Summit I shall never have any great hope of success unless a final camp is so placed.” These words, reinforced by Longstaff’s recommendation to me to make this final camp my very special responsibility, remained very much in my thoughts until the day when it had been achieved.
And when John Hunt makes something his “very special responsibility”, he puts his heart and soul into it. To lift this last camp as high as possible, he cast himself in a supporting role in the assault, and carried supplies up to 27,500 ft, a little higher than Lambert and Tenzing had reached the previous year!
Here is how John Hunt approached the risk posed by the climatic conditions:















